Principios personalistas e impersonalistas en neuroética: las distinciones metafísicas en valor de contingencia y la evolución de la estructura normativa

Value theory has traditionally sited value to person or person affecting concerns. Efforts to broaden contingency loci beyond the person, however, or even to be wholly independent of such concerns, increasingly challenge this notion, an ethical architecture termed imper- sonalist and now increasingly used in neuroethical contexts. In neuroethics contingency shifts typically adopt one of three formats: 1) intergenerational transactions where larger social entities constitute the value site, 2) extended mind theory, in which the person centered locus embraces nonperson functional elements, or 3) posthumanism where value is attached to malleable, posthuman entities. Impersonalist contingencies are characterized metaphysically by mixed modes in which indeterminate relations supervene on person and non-person entities, or constitute the contingency locus alone. Value contingencies in personalist architectures, by contrast, are attached to metaphysical entities that are qualified by categorical accidents. Impersonalist formats thus site value to larger, less individuated systems characterized by their malleability; therefore, they can be expected to diminish anthropocentrism, enhance non-person value parity, and promote the deconstruction of value. Personalist formats, by contrast, site value to individuated, person or person affecting entities. Such formats can be expected to emphasize the integration of the individual and metaphysically distinct form, and to preserve intrinsic value.